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1) Introduction 
Growing out of a global health crisis, one of the biggest issues within bioethics today is 
the possibility of the establishment of a global system of compensated organ donation, and the 
issue has garnered a tremendous amount of arguments on both sides of the spectrum. Ever since 
organ transplants became a medical reality in 1954, the need for viable organs has been growing, 
and the development and perfection of transplant techniques only exacerbates an already critical 
problem (Tullius, 2013). In virtually every country in the world, the organ waiting list dwarfs the 
amount of viable organs available to use for transplantation, and it’s clear that cadaveric organ 
donations are not able to fully supply the demanding market for organ transplant procedures 
(Satayathum, 2005). For these practical reasons, it has been suggested that countries, either 
individually or globally, develop a regulated system of organ donation compensation to help 
alleviate this global mass shortage of organs.  Not everyone is on board with this idea, though, 
and critics argue that a system of this nature is an unethical commodification of the body and its 
implementation would lead to exploitation of the poor, violations of informed consent, and 
unjustified harm to the donor (de Castro, 2003). 
 Focusing specifically on the kidney organ, in this essay I examine the popular ethical 
arguments both for and against a global system of compensated kidney donation, and I analyze 
Iran’s model of kidney donation compensation for its advantages and disadvantages as a model 
for a global system of kidney donation compensation.  Furthermore, I suggest changes to Iran’s 
model to avoid its disadvantages and come closer to establishing a model for a global system of 
kidney donation compensation.  It must be noted that in this essay the term “compensated kidney 
donation” will go beyond mere reimbursement into actual payments, gifts, and/or benefits 
relayed from the donee to the donor in payment for the kidney donation itself. I begin by 
analyzing the ethical arguments for compensated kidney donation, including arguments from the 
global kidney shortage, organ trafficking, global ethical principles, and financial assistance of the 
poor.  Next, the analysis transitions to the arguments against compensated kidney donation, and 
these arguments include claims of commodification, exploitation, violation of informed consent, 
and unjustified harm to the donor.  Switching gears, I then examine Iran’s model of kidney 
donation compensation through its satisfaction of the benefits of compensated donation and 
avoidance of the harms of compensated donation.  Finally, I make suggestions regarding Iran’s 
weaknesses as a global model for compensated donation and aim to come closer to finding an 
ethical and efficacious model to address the world’s mass kidney shortage. 
2) Ethical Arguments for Compensated Kidney Donation 
 Most likely the largest factor supporting compensated donation, the global mass organ 
shortage is one of the primary ethical arguments in favor of a global system of compensated 
donation.  With an estimated global kidney waiting list of over 200,000 people, and hundreds of 
thousands more waiting on other organs, the mass organ shortage is a global crisis that provides 
a substantial reason to incentive live organ donations (World Health Organization, 2007). The 
presence of a vast network of organ trafficking has also been a reason cited by proponents of a 
system of compensated donation, because it is believed that a regulated system would be much 
more efficacious, safe, and less abusive and harmful than the current system of organ trafficking 
(Radcliffe-Richards et al., 1998). In addition to these two factors, it has been argued that 
restricting options of the poor is wrong and the ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, and 
justice justify a system of compensated kidney donation (Rothman and Rothman, 2006).  
 2.1) Global Organ Shortage and Trafficking 
 Though exact numbers on global organ transplants and waiting lists are difficult to 
determine, it’s clear that there is a massive global shortage of organs that affects virtually every 
country in the world.  Globally in 2005, there were roughly 6,000 heart transplants, 21,000 liver 
transplants, and 66,000 kidney transplants throughout the year, and this number is expected to 
grow every year (Shimazono, 2007). Waiting lists are much harder to determine, but the World 
Health Organization estimates that over 200,000 individuals worldwide are on the kidney 
transplant waiting list (World Health Organization, 2007). Obviously, from these numbers it is 
easily noticed that the kidney is the organ with the most demand, and it represents a large 
majority of the global organ waiting list. Thus, naturally its high demand subjects it to the most 
forms of abuse and trafficking (Rothman and Rothman, 2006). 
 The number of kidneys in demand for the United States makes up approximately half of 
the global kidney waiting list. Roughly 101,000 Americans are already on the list, and every 
month 3,000 more join.  In the United States in 2013, more than one-third of the kidney 
transplants were from live organ donation, but only 17,000 kidney transplants transpired 
throughout the year (National Kidney Foundation, 2015). Studies from 2003 even show that 
percentage-wise the United States has a much lower percentage of kidney patients on the kidney 
waiting list than other countries.  For example, Spain and the United Kingdom both hover around 
fifty percent with half of their kidney patients being put on the kidney waiting list (Satayathum, 
2005). These great disparities between the yearly number of needed kidney transplants and the 
number of actual kidney transplants highlights the great practical need for a global regulated 
organ trade. Proponents of an organ trade argue that adding incentives, such as monetary 
compensation, to kidney donations will dramatically increase the annual number of kidneys 
donated, and if enough individuals would participate the global kidney waiting list could be 
dramatically diminished. This way, roughly 200,000 people would have a chance at escaping 
organ waiting lists, and thousands more would not face preventable deaths (World Health 
Organization, 2007). 
 Although the global mass organ shortage is adopted as the main practical reason 
proponents support a regulated system of compensated donation, the existence of an organ black 
market and its organ trafficking system has to be a close second.  In the Declaration of Istanbul, 
organ trafficking is defined as:  
…the recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring or receipt of living or deceased persons or their 
organs by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or of the giving to, or the 
receiving by, a third party of payments or benefits to achieve the transfer of control over the 
potential donor, for the purpose of exploitation by the removal of organs for transplantation 
(Declaration of Istanbul, 2008). 
Thus, organ trafficking necessarily involves the use of abuse, force, or coercion in the 
recruitment, harboring, and transfer of humans or their organs.  Trafficking actually comes in 
two forms: human trafficking of organs and individual organ trafficking.  The former involves 
trafficking humans in order to transplant their organs, and the latter involves trafficking the 
already excised organ (Budiani-Saberi and Columb, 2013). Organ trafficking then exemplifies 
one of the main objections to a global system of compensated donation: exploitation of the poor 
and violations of informed consent.  This objection states that organ trafficking denies the right 
 of informed consent to donors and vulnerable populations that are exploited and unjustly taken 
advantage of by the use of abuse, deception, and coercion (Budiani-Saberi and Delmonico, 
2008). 
 International studies suggest that roughly ten percent of the global yearly kidney 
transplants occur out of an organ sale system, and the vast majority of these involve organ 
trafficking of some kind (Budiani-Saberi and Columb, 2013). With roughly 66,000 kidney 
transplants in 2005, and this number surely growing since annually, this constitutes an average of 
around 6,000 cases of human organ trafficking yearly (Shimazono, 2007). So organ trafficking is 
a real problem that must be addressed.  However, organ trafficking flourishes within the context 
of the prohibition of an organ trade, creating illegal economic incentives for the black market of 
organs.  It is argued by proponents of a compensated donation that the best way to deal with 
organ trafficking is to remove the incentives and decriminalize compensated donation. They 
argue that this could be achieved by establishing a highly regulated system of compensated 
donation.  Essentially, a globally agreed upon and nationally-ran regulated system could enact 
regulations and penalties to restrict hospitals and transplant centers from receiving organs outside 
of the regulated trade.  If organs were only acceptable from approved agencies, this would 
decrease the incentives of organ trafficking and the practice could be greatly decreased, if not 
totally eliminated.  Furthermore, regulations and processes can be enacted to ensure informed 
consent of patients, including the steps of disclosure of information, assurance of adequate 
understanding, and the attainment of express, formal consent, which are all essentials of the 
process of informed consent (ten Have and Jean, 2009). 
 Of course, one argument against this claim is that practical circumstances in some 
countries will not allow this type of strenuous regulation, and organ trafficking will still exist.  
To the extent that this might be a legitimate objection, it also applies to governance in many 
other areas where other types of governmental agencies aren’t defunded and shut down due to 
this same possibility.  Proponents of compensated donation emphasize that a regulated system 
would at the very least decrease the amount of organ trafficking cases, making it completely 
worthwhile. In response, an argument can be made that regulation wouldn’t necessarily address 
the problem of exploitation, yet vulnerable populations are at a much greater risk for exploitation 
when there are no regulations.  In a regulated system, exploitation can be addressed and attempts 
can be made to avoid or lessen it. Proponents then argue that a regulated system of compensated 
donation would likely involve fewer cases of exploitation and organ trafficking. Thus, it is no 
surprise that for proponents a great reduction in organ trafficking provides a substantial practical 
reason to support a global regulated system of compensated kidney donation (Radcliffe-Richards 
et al., 1998). 
2.2) Argument from Ethical Principles 
 In addition to the practical reasons of the global organ shortage and organ trafficking, 
proponents also argue that common ethical principles justify the compensation of organ 
donation.  In particular, the concept of principlism is commonly used to justify this act, because 
it contains the ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, justice, and non-maleficence, all of 
which proponents use to argue for the ethical validity of compensated donation (Kelly, Magill, 
and ten Have, 2013). 
  Autonomy is defined as a concept of self-rule that is free from limiting constraints from 
others and impediments on meaningful choice. The autonomous person acts according to a self-
chosen plan without interference or limitations upon that plan from other individuals.  When one 
does not act autonomously, it is due to the incapability of realizing the plans and desires of the 
individual, and this incapability arises from some sort of hindrance upon the freedom of the 
agent (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013). Three conditions are necessary for autonomous action: 
intentionality, understanding, and noncontrol.  For the act to be autonomous, the action must be 
intentionally willed, and the agent must adequately understand the action and its consequences.  
The agent must also not be under the controlling influence of another, because an agent can only 
act autonomously when the act is not directly affected by an impressionable factor or influence 
that affects the agent’s plans (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013). 
 The principle of autonomy does have its limits, and restrictions upon autonomy are 
usually only justified to protect the autonomy of others (ten Have and Jean, 2009). This is in 
accordance with the negative obligation imposed by autonomy, which states that autonomous 
agents should not interfere in the autonomous actions of other agents.  There is also a positive 
obligation imposed by autonomy, and it states that agents should foster autonomous agency for 
fellow agents, which includes the dissemination of information that is potentially relevant to an 
action they are deliberating on (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013). To support compensated 
donation, proponents argue that agents have the right to exercise their autonomy, and as long as 
it passes the obligations imposed by autonomy, it should be allowed (Rothman and Rothman, 
2006). For them, compensated donation passes the negative obligation of autonomy, because no 
other agent’s autonomy is restricted in individual organ sale. The point is that a strictly regulated 
system of compensated donation would have safeguards to foster autonomous decision making 
and informed consent, which reflects the positive obligation of autonomy. This argument then 
posits that respecting the principle of autonomy can justify regulated compensated donation 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2013). 
 The second concept of principlism that supports the act of compensated donation is the 
principle of beneficence, and this principle basically states that one must act and do good 
towards others (Kelly, Magill, and ten Have, 2013). It imposes an obligation upon individuals to 
act in ways that benefit other people.  Depending upon the context, there are differing types of 
beneficence, such as general, specific, obligatory, and ideal.  General beneficence is beneficence 
towards strangers and those who we do not have emotional relationships with, and specific 
beneficence is the act of good towards those we do have emotional relationships with 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2013). 
The difference between obligatory beneficence and ideal beneficence is a little more 
practically obscure, but theoretically the difference involves the act’s obligation.  In obligatory 
beneficence, acts of beneficence are morally imposed and required; whereas, ideal beneficence 
only includes non-obligatory acts of beneficence that are nonetheless virtuous, heroic, and noble. 
From the perspective of compensated donation, acts of beneficence will either be ideal/general or 
ideal/specific, depending upon whether or not the donor had an emotional relationship with the 
donee, though it stands to reason that in organ sale it would mostly be ideal/general.  Thus, this 
approach argues that the principle of beneficence supports a regulated system of compensated 
donation and opposes its prohibition, which would dramatically decrease acts of beneficence 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2013). 
 The third concept of principlism is the principle of justice, and it is also used by some to 
support compensated donation.  Justice cannot be restricted to a singular definition. In the 
context of organ donation, it usually refers to matters of distribution of scarce resources, and it 
provides a guide to areas of concern for specific normative theories to address (Gert, Culver, and 
Clouser, 2006). One of the most influential theories of justice is Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities 
theory, and it provides the principle with normative content. Many proponents of a system of 
compensated donation use this normative theory of justice as evidence for this type of system’s 
ethical justification (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013). 
Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities theory of justice is premised on the fact that all humans 
are equal in worth, value, and dignity due purely to the fact that they are human.  For Nussbaum, 
this value stems from the human’s inherent ability to make moral decisions in order to plan a 
unique, individual life that is in accordance with one’s own plan and conception of the good.  
This value then entitles each individual within a state to certain rights and types of treatment that 
allows them to realize their personal conception of the good (Nussbaum, 1999). Nussbaum 
considers the types of treatment that individuals are entitled to as essential capabilities that must 
allow individuals to realize their own personal conception of the good.  She argues that there are 
ten essential capabilities that a state must provide for its citizens, and without these capabilities 
individuals are not living a truly dignified human life (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013). With 
these capabilities available, individuals will not be constrained by fear, hunger, or the absence of 
opportunity (Nussbaum, 1999). 
Obviously, the availability of autonomous choice is crucial to Nussbaum’s capabilities 
theory, and this crucial factor is emphasized by proponents of compensated kidney donation.  
One essential feature is the capability of bodily health and integrity whereby individuals should 
be “…able to have good health, including reproductive health; being adequately nourished; being 
able to have adequate shelter” (Nussbaum, 1999).  
To justifiably be denied a capability in this approach, the capability must be unattainable.  
For example, mortality is not a denying of the essential capability of life, because immortality is 
unattainable.  However, if an essential capability is attainable, then Nussbaum argues it must be 
available.  In renal failure and other conditions that require a kidney transplant, the shortage of 
organs (and, as argued by proponents of compensated kidney donation, the prohibition of 
compensated donation) denies hundreds of thousands of individuals the essential capability of 
good bodily health. Proponents argue that such a capability is attainable through a system of 
compensated donation and its prohibition would therefore be unjust in this normative theory of 
justice. Individuals with renal failure have their inherent dignity violated by the absence of 
opportunity, and allowing those individuals on the kidney waiting list to die also denies them the 
essential capability of life and the right to not die prematurely (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013). 
It should also be noted that Nussbaum developed her approach to emphasize an international or 
global context. Thus, proponents argue that the prohibition of compensated kidney donation is 
contrary to the principle of justice as espoused in Nussbaum’s capabilities theory of justice 
(Garrett, 2008). 
2.3) Assistance of the Poor 
 Proponents of compensated organ donation also emphasize the potential financial 
benefits it could offer to poorer individuals.  It is argued that individuals should be able to 
 exercise their autonomy and improve their life chances by selling their organ, namely the kidney, 
for economic relief if they so choose (Rothman and Rothman, 2006). Yet the majority of 
objections to compensated donation focus on the factors involving this practical reason in 
support of compensated donation, because these objections aim at protecting poorer populations 
from evil practices and exploitation.  However, proponents of compensated donation argue that 
these objections and prohibitions unnecessarily limit poorer populations’ ability to better their 
situations and ultimately harm them in an unnecessary, unjustifiable way, which brings us to the 
last component of principlism: non-maleficence (Kelly, Magill, ten Have, 2013). 
 The principle of non-maleficence is used to support an organ trade in an indirect manner. 
This principle basically obligates individuals to not harm others, or at least to employ the least 
harmful act that can be employed.  Basically, it obligates humans to avoid harm when possible 
and perform the least amount of harm when necessary (Beauchamp and Childress, 2013). 
Proponents then use this ethical principle to argue for a system of compensated organ donation in 
two ways. First, similar to one of the first pro-compensation arguments discussed above, 
proponents argue that the principle of non-maleficence obligates us to act in ways that produces 
the least amount of harm when possible, which they believe can be associated with the 
development of a system of donation compensation.  Since organ trafficking has been shown to 
thrive in a prohibition and other attempts to curb its occurrence have failed, proponents argue 
that the principle of non-maleficence obligates us to legalize and regulate the trade in order to 
produce the least amount of harm possible.  It is argued that there is much more risk for abuse, 
exploitation, and harm when the trade is illegalized and forced underground rather than openly 
regulated; thus, by the principle of non-maleficence a system of compensated donation can be 
ethically forged in the name of reducing harms from organ trafficking and the black market 
(Radcliffe-Richards et al., 1998). 
 The second way proponents use the principle of non-maleficence to justify compensated 
donation is by claiming the prohibition harms poorer populations by taking away an option for 
them to better themselves financially (Radcliffe-Richards et al., 1998). This is actually the 
position of the famous bioethicist Robert Veatch, who has recently taken up this position due to a 
continual neglect of the well-being of the poor (Rothman and Rothman, 2006). According to 
Veatch, it is unethical for the state to prohibit the opportunity of compensated donation while 
simultaneously refusing to provide the goods of life to our poorest peers.  Proponents claim this 
is a violation of the principles of autonomy and non-maleficence due to the harm caused by the 
prohibition (Veatch, 2003). 
 The use of these ethical principles of principlism as an argument for a global model of 
compensated donation is strengthened by their existence in global ethical principles, too.  A 
branch of the United Nations known as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) has developed a global ethical standard complete with a list of global 
ethical principles spelled out in their Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (ten 
Have and Jean, 2009). Included in these global ethical principles are the following relevant 
components: 
Article 4 - Benefit and Harm: In applying and advancing scientific knowledge, medical practice 
and associated technologies, direct and indirect benefits to patients, research participants and 
other affected individuals should be maximized and any possible harm to such individuals should 
be minimized. 
 Article 5 - Autonomy and Individual Responsibility: The autonomy of persons to make decisions, 
while taking responsibility for those decisions and respecting the autonomy of others, is to be 
respected. For persons who are not capable of exercising autonomy, special measures are to be 
taken to protect their rights and interests. 
Article 10 - Equality, Justice, and Equity: The fundamental equality of all human beings in 
dignity and rights is to be respected so that they are treated justly and equitably (ten Have and 
Jean, 2009). 
Articles 4, 5, and 10 of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights all refer to the 
ethical principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, and justice, respectively.  Thus, 
the ethical principles of principlism are inherent within these global ethical principles, and these 
arguments from ethical principles for compensated donation are then relevant for a global model 
of compensated donation.  However, this global ethical standard also discusses principles of 
human dignity, consent, and human vulnerability, which turns our attention to the arguments 
against systems of compensated donation (ten Have and Jean, 2009). 
3) Ethical Arguments against Compensated Kidney Donation 
 For as many arguments as there are for the development of a system of compensated 
donation, there are just as many arguments saying the exact opposite. There are three main types 
of arguments used against compensated donation: arguments from commodification, arguments 
from exploitation and informed consent, and arguments from harm (Wilkinson and Garrard, 
1996). Each of these arguments claim to justify the prohibition of compensated donation by 
themselves, and they are each intrinsically related to one or more of the global ethical principles, 
including human dignity, harm, consent, and respect for human vulnerability (ten Have and Jean, 
2009). 
3.1) Human Dignity and Commodification 
 The argument from commodification is based on the very first principle of the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, human dignity, which states: Human dignity, 
human rights, and fundamental freedoms are to be fully respected (ten Have and Jean, 2009). As 
a concept and principle, human dignity refers to the intrinsic value every single human being 
contains, and this value is an inherent dignity that must be respected unconditionally (ten Have 
and Jean, 2009). This is an ideal which is very prominent in Kantian philosophy, because Kant 
posited that humans contain an inherent value that makes us intrinsically valuable. Thus, part of 
his Categorical Imperative for ethical action is to always treat people as ends in themselves and 
never merely as a means (Kant, 1997). This means that people should always be treated as 
valuable individuals and never merely as a means towards some other end.  Opponents of 
compensated donation argue that providing monetary compensation for a person to donate their 
organ treats that individual merely as a means, a collection of useful parts, rather than a valuable 
individual that is to be respected wholly, and it is to change that individual from a “person” to a 
“thing.” This treats someone merely as a means rather than an end in themselves, thus making it 
an unethical action (Marway, Johnson, and Widdows, 2014). 
 This process then attempts to turn “persons” into “things” by objectifying their parts into 
commodities, i.e. goods that can be sold on the market (Cherry, 2008). To commodify something 
is to take something with intrinsic value and objectify it, and once it is objectified it must be 
commercialized to give it an exchange value, which allows it to be sold for a price.  This 
 completes the transition from a “person,” or thing with intrinsic value, to a “thing” that is subject 
to market relations (Marway, Johnson, and Widdows, 2014). Michael Sandel describes this 
process as corruption of the human person, and he believes it promotes an objectifying and 
degrading view of the human person.  He argues that this corruption is caused by adding market 
relations to a non-market product, so to place the human body in this market situation is to 
corrupt the very integrity of the human person (Sandel, 2012).  
 It might be argued that organ donation as a whole treats “persons” as “things,” because it 
necessarily treats parts of individuals as interchangeable.  Technically this latter clause is true, 
because for organ donation and transplantation to be a viable method for addressing organ 
failures and needs, differing organs of differing people must be interchangeable.  So, organs are 
technically objectified in organ donation.  However, they are not commercialized in organ 
donation, but rather they’re given out of altruism. In altruistic organ donation, individual parts 
aren’t thought of as “saleable,” so they are not given an exchange value and, consequently, not 
commodified. Further, the language of donation itself distances this act from market relations 
and commodification. Thus, though both organ donation and organ sale deal with objectifying 
parts of “persons” to use in another, only the sale of organs unjustifiably commercializes the 
body and unethically treats it as a commodity (Marway, Johnson, and Widdows, 2014). 
3.2) Exploitation and Informed Consent 
 The argument from exploitation and informed consent is actually based on two global 
ethical principles: consent and respect for human vulnerability. These principles require people 
to gather consent from the patient for any medical intervention and to take into special account 
human vulnerability, especially traditionally vulnerable populations (ten Have and Jean, 2009). 
Throughout history, vulnerable populations have traditionally been taken advantage of, so it has 
been a priority in modern times to pay special attention in one’s dealings with these vulnerable 
populations. One vulnerable population that has been consistently taken advantage of throughout 
history is the poor, and that is the population the argument from exploitation and informed 
consent focuses on. This argument basically has two main components: 1) exploiting the poor, 
and 2) doubting the voluntariness to sell an organ (Marway, Johnson, and Widdows, 2014). 
 The first of these components of this argument states that compensated donation 
unjustifiably exploits the poor, because the relationship between “donor” and “donee” pits the 
poor against the rich.  It is argued that it is unethical that rich donees who are willing to pay for 
an organ should be allowed to exploit vulnerable populations who are more in need of the money 
than the organ at the particular time. Opponents argue that the globally rich would be pitted 
against the globally poor, and the market would almost necessarily operate under these 
conditions.  For opponents, then, inequality would be a defining piece of the organ market, and a 
market based on this concept cannot possibly be ethically justifiable (Marway, Johnson, and 
Widdows, 2014). 
 The second component of the argument states that compensated donation would force 
upon poor individuals an almost impossible dilemma: keep an integral part of one’s body or sell 
it to pay the bills.  Basically, this argument states that informed consent can never be achieved in 
this context due to the voluntariness of the decision, the third step in the process of informed 
consent, never being real (ten Have and Jean, 2009). Sandel labels this component of the 
argument the “fairness objection,” and he also points to the injustice of inequality being the basis 
 of the market. He states, “…market exchanges are not always as voluntary as market enthusiasts 
suggest. A peasant may agree to sell his kidney or cornea to feed his starving family, but his 
agreement may not really be voluntary. He may be unfairly coerced, in effect, by the necessities 
of his situation” (Sandel, 2012). Thus, the argument from exploitation and informed consent 
states that it is unethical for the globally rich to exploit the vulnerable populations of the globally 
poor, and the decision to sell one’s kidney is a coerced response due to financial influences, 
making it an unethical and unjustifiable practice (Marway, Johnson, and Widdows, 2014). 
3.3) Harm: Physical, Emotional, Social 
 A third and final argument against compensated donation involves the amount of 
physical, emotional, and social harm the act of selling one’s kidney involves, and this is related 
to the global ethical principle of “Benefit and Harm” that states that “any possible harm…should 
be minimized” (ten Have and Jean, 2009). This argument is actually an argument from non-
maleficence, the ethical principle that obligates us to do no harm when possible. When arguing 
against physical harm, this argument from non-maleficence pertains insofar as it can be argued 
that organ transplantation, donation, and sale are too harmful to justify any amount of good that 
comes from them.  When analyzing the evidence, though, studies show that there is limited 
short-term and long-term medical risk involved in kidney donation.  In fact, one particular study 
discovered an 85 percent survival rate over 20 years after the donation of a kidney, and the 
mortality of the group was not related in any way to factors associated with kidney donation or 
decreased kidney function (Fehrman-Ekholm, 1997). In terms of short-term risks, other studies 
suggest only a 0.03 percent chance of mortality and 20 percent chance of morbidity shortly after 
the donation, and there is fairly conclusive evidence that there is no higher rate of renal failure 
amongst kidney donors than in the normal population. However, opponents argue that these 
statistics are only valid for ideal, sterile conditions, and virtually all transplants that come from 
compensation systems are not ideal.  This is especially true in cases of organ trafficking and 
transplant tourism where many transplants take place in back-alley clinics and clandestine 
transplant centers (Erin and Harris, 2003). 
 The more damning arguments from harm, though, come from arguments of emotional 
and social harms.  Certain recent studies have shown that donors who have sold their kidneys 
exhibit high signs of anxiety, despair, and a sense of hopelessness, and many reported that these 
emotions started post-nephrectomy. Many also reported withdrawing from their friends and 
family due to a feeling of “wrongness” and “shamefulness” about what they had just done, which 
seems to suggest an inherent ideation that this practice is intrinsically wrong.  Body image issues 
also inflicted those who sold organs, because they commonly reported feeling as if their body 
was somehow “fragmented” and damaged now.  Furthermore, many recent donors also reported 
a certain stigmatization from others for selling their kidney. Many felt socially isolated, and a 
large percentage reported that they were unwilling to share with others that they were an organ 
donor.  Others have been excommunicated from their churches, excluded from marriages, and 
told to hide their scars whenever possible to avoid being known as an organ donor. Opponents 
argue that these harms are a far cry from the feelings of well-being, respect, and self-worth that 
many proponents claim come with compensated kidney donation, and the minimal benefit that 
this practice provides is not worth the physical, emotional, and social harms that it afflicts upon 
the donor (Koplin, 2014). 
4) The Iranian Model of Kidney Donation Compensation 
  Now that the arguments for and against compensated donation have been thoroughly 
discussed, it is now prudent to focus on an actual model of kidney donation compensation to 
analyze its capability as a global model and how well the model is attaining the benefits and 
avoiding the harms of compensated donation. Though compensation for organ donation can 
occur in many forms, including medical benefits, funeral incentives, tax benefits, and many other 
avenues, direct cash and financial benefits naturally garner the most attention and discussion.  
The most notable example of this type of system of cash-compensated organ donation is Iran, 
and they have one of the most successful transplant systems in the world that has erased their 
kidney waiting list since late 1999 (Larijani, Zahedi, and Taheri, 2004). 
4.1) The Iranian Model 
 Iran’s kidney donation and transplantation system has evolved drastically in the last thirty 
years.  It began in the 1980’s as an unregulated international market that was welcome to anyone 
willing to pay the price and do the work of finding a suitable organ match.  Beginning in the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s, this began to change as the Iranian Ministry of Health began to get 
involved with the practice.  After noticing that many donors and recipients were scared off by the 
potential exploitation, manipulation, and unfair treatment involved with the process of buying 
and selling a kidney, the Iranian Patients’ Kidney Foundation (IPKF) took over and started 
regulating the process of arranging kidney pairings, writing contracts, and other essential 
services of the kidney compensation system (Frye-Revere, 2014).  
 Today, the Iranian Model of Kidney Transplantation (IMKT) is a tightly regulated system 
that is seen as a good, but not perfect, model of a functioning organ compensation system.  The 
IPKF registers the statistics and information of both candidates for kidney transplants and willing 
donors into a database to find a match for each party.  After obtaining the proper consents, the 
IPKF introduces the matched pair to each other, and the pair comes to an agreement on an 
acceptable price to be paid from the recipient of the kidney to the donor of the kidney (Aramesh, 
2014).  The role of the IPKF and other charity organizations that also work in matching potential 
donors with recipients, such as the Dialysis and Transplant Patients Association (DATPA), 
cannot be overstated, because their involvement cuts out the “middle-man” of organ brokering.  
This greatly lessens the chances of corruption, favoritism, and exploitation, because no conflicts 
of interest will occur if these organizations and the transplant teams have no financial ties to the 
matching of the pair (Larijani, Zahedi, and Taheri, 2004). 
 After the IPKF has matched the two parties and they’ve agreed on a fair payout from the 
recipient to the donor, the kidney transplant takes place.  Once completed, a nongovernmental 
organization known as the Charity Foundation for Special Diseases rewards the kidney donor for 
their gift with further monetary compensation in addition to a yearlong, free medical insurance.  
To ensure proper protocols, fair payment, and ethical application, all transplantation centers and 
compensated kidney donations are located and performed in university hospitals under close 
supervision of the Ministry of Health and Medical Education.  Iranian compensated kidney 
donation is further exclusively limited to Iranian citizens, and foreigners must provide a donor 
from their own nationality in Iran (Aramesh, 2014). 
4.2) The Iranian Model’s Benefits 
  Being one of the very few countries in the world allowing some sort of compensated 
kidney donation, the Iranian model provides a plethora of benefits.  First and foremost, the 
model’s greatest benefit and success has been the unquestionable termination of the kidney 
transplant waiting list since 1999.  The addition of financial incentives for kidney donation in the 
late 1980’s and a lower rate of patients with End Stage Renal Disease combined to make short 
work of the kidney waiting list in the 1990’s (Ghods and Savaj, 2006). Iranians in need of a 
kidney transplant regularly receive an organ in a speedy manner, so long as they’re able and 
willing to pay for it. This is generally not an issue, though, because the lower demand for 
kidneys compared to their much higher supply has kept the prices relatively low, which has 
consequently made them affordable for virtually every Iranian patient in need (Aramesh, 2014). 
Furthermore, charitable organizations usually step in to help aid with the finances of the 
transplant if the recipient is too poor and unable to pay for the transplantation and costs 
themselves (Ghods and Savaj, 2006). 
 A close second benefit is the eradication of organ trafficking in Iran. Since the Iranian 
Patients’ Kidney Foundation matches kidney donation pairs and organizes all the payment and 
procurement details of the transplant, kidney brokers and organ brokering agencies, who are the 
usual suspects and catalysts of organ trafficking, can play no role in the transplant process. 
Transplants only occur though this governmental foundation, and they’re also only allowed in 
university hospitals in Iran, which are under strict scrutiny from the Ministry of Health and 
Medical Education (Aramesh, 2014). Furthermore, this model also eradicated organ trafficking 
in the form of transplant tourism, too. This practice is one of the biggest bioethical issues within 
global ethics and transplant ethics, and it usually involves individuals who need a kidney 
transplant coming over from a country that doesn’t allow organ sale to a country where they can 
legally buy themselves a kidney for transplantation.  These individuals are usually motivated by 
long organ waiting lists in their home country and the lack of an opportunity to buy an organ 
from another due to their country’s prohibition.  This is an extensive process that usually 
involves organ brokers and other health care professionals to manage the procurement of the 
organ, the exchanging of money, and the scheduling and location of the transplant (Shimazono, 
2007). When this practice started to become noticed by government officials, the Iranian 
Ministry of Health banned all foreign recipients from receiving kidney transplants from Iranian 
donors, which essentially prevented the practice of transplant tourism in Iran (Ghods and Savaj, 
2006). 
What makes this benefit even more impressive is the fact that this model is thriving as a 
deterrent to organ trafficking within a developing country with a poor corruption index and 
reputation.  Transparency International is a global organization with the purpose and aims of 
locating, broadcasting, and destroying corruption throughout governmental agencies throughout 
the world.  This organization puts out an annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) that ranks 
each country according to its corruption prevalence, perception, and control.  Iran ranks low in 
every factor of corruption, scoring a mere 27 points out of a total of 100 points and ranking 136 
out of the 175 nations that this organization surveyed.  Furthermore, they rank in the 20th 
percentile when it comes to controlling corruption.  Thus, the fact that this model has avoided 
rampant corruption while simultaneously meeting its goal of alleviating the kidney waiting list 
and halting organ trafficking within the country is a great testament to this model’s effectiveness, 
ability to be implemented and evade corruption, and overall promise as a global model 
(Transparency International, 2015). 
  Other benefits of the Iranian model include the promotion of autonomy and control over 
one’s body via the allowance to donate one’s kidney for compensation and the promotion of 
justice via elimination of the kidney waiting list, organ trafficking, transplant tourism, and 
financial assistance of poorer population.  Even acts of beneficence are on the rise, because 
organ donation is essentially an act of beneficence towards another, with the government even 
referring to their organ compensation as a “gift for altruism” (Aramesh, 2014). One last major 
benefit of this model is its ability to address notions of commercialism and exploitation within 
systems of compensated organ donation.  Though a component of the exploitation objection 
argues that a system of compensated donation would only benefit the rich who are wealthy 
enough to pay for these organs, studies within Iran’s model show this is clearly not the case.  For 
example, one study of over 500 renal transplant recipients found that over fifty percent of the 
kidney donation recipients were poor, and only a little over thirteen percent of the recipients 
were rich.  An essential part of Iran’s model is the active role played by charity organizations, 
which help pay for the expenses of the transplant surgery for poorer patients who cannot afford.  
Thus, this model of compensated donation benefits the sick of both the rich and the poor (Ghods 
and Savaj, 2006). 
4.3) The Iranian Model’s Drawbacks 
 Though the Iranian model provides quite a few advantages and benefits, it also has some 
disadvantages that are inherent within the objections against a system of compensated donation.  
First and foremost, the Iranian model does nothing to address the commodification objection to 
compensated donation, and, in fact, it tends to take an extreme regard in this matter. For 
example, there are two separate direct monetary transactions that take place within each 
individual kidney transplant within Iran.  The first transaction is a direct monetary negotiation 
between the donor and the potential recipient that decides how much the potential recipient will 
pay the donor for donating their kidney.  The second monetary transaction comes from a 
nongovernmental organization known as the Charity Foundation for Special Diseases, and this 
organization provides monetary compensation to the donor that is known as the “gift for 
altruism” from the state.  Though the donation is an act of beneficence that will help another, it 
definitely is a payment directly for the kidney donation that is not technically altruism.  This 
arrangement really tends to commodify the donation to a nearly unacceptable level (Aramesh, 
2014). 
 A second potential disadvantage with this model is its reliance on poorer populations for 
the supply of organs.  Though studies suggest that over half of the kidney donation recipients in 
Iran are poor, an even larger percentage, 84 percent, of the kidney donations came from poor 
Iranians (Ghods and Savaj, 2006). This is somewhat to be expected, though, since financial 
incentives of this nature are going to appeal much more attractive to poorer populations. This 
brings into question the voluntariness of the decision with the main drive behind kidney donation 
being the financial aspect (Aramesh, 2014).  A related disadvantage of this system is the lopsided 
reliance of financial incentives over non-financial incentives in this model. In the “gift for 
altruism” package from the Iranian NGO charity is included a 1-year free medical insurance for 
donors, but generally there is no other non-financial health incentive for donation, in addition to 
a lack of health support in the years following donation (Pajouhi, Zahedi, Pajouhi, and Larijani, 
2014). Further disadvantages of this model include a stigmatization of donors and the 
suppression of altruistic donation (Aramesh, 2014). Many donors have felt stigmatized and 
 socially isolated by both foreigners and some in their own country for donating their organ for 
compensation, because it is sometimes viewed as improper or inhumane to donate one’s kidney 
for compensation (Koplin, 2014). 
5) Addressing the Weaknesses 
 Though the benefits and advantages of the Iranian model seem to outweigh the 
disadvantages, there are certain steps and revisions that can be made to further address these 
disadvantages. Furthermore, even though some fundamental objections, such as objections from 
corruption (commodification) or fairness (exploitation), to this practice will always remain, 
perhaps there is some middle ground that can be reached for these objections where it can be 
agreed by all that the advantages of a certain model of donation compensation outweigh the 
disadvantages. This is my attempt to address Iran’s model’s weaknesses and reach this point 
(Sandel, 2012). 
5.1) Tax Deductions 
 To address the weakness of, extreme, commodification in this model, a revised model 
must pass two conditions: (a) the notion of donation must be retained, and (b) there must be no 
direct payment for organs.  Using moral or nonfinancial incentives would be consistent with 
these conditions, but, practically it appears not to provide enough incentives to meet the need for 
viable organs (Veatch, 2003). Other systems have been proposed using indirect methods of 
payment, such as scholarships, but they ended up being disguised versions of the traditional 
organ sale (Cherry, 2008). 
 One system suggested by proponents of an organ trade that meets these conditions is a 
system based on tax benefits received for charitable donations one made throughout the year.  In 
the United States and most other countries, individuals are allowed to deduct charitable 
donations that they made off of their taxable income.  When one makes any sort of donation to a 
religious organization, non-profit organization, charity, or government agency, the amount of the 
donation is a tax write-off that one does not have to pay taxes on.  For example, if Shelly made 
$150,000 annually and she was in the 33 percent tax bracket, a $10,000 donation to UNICEF 
would actually only cost her $6,700, because she’d be able to deduct that $10,000 off of her 
taxable income of $150,000, making it $140,000 of taxable income.  These incentives are 
promoted by nations to encourage charitable giving to charities and other organizations (Charity 
Navigator, 2015). 
 Since governmental agencies are allowed to accept charitable donations that are tax 
deductible, the Iranian Ministry of Health or the Iranian Patients’ Kidney Foundation could then 
make donations eligible to be considered tax deductible.  Once achieving this status, then 
donations could be incentivized without any, or at least as minimally as possible, bodily 
commodification, because this practice could pass the two conditions.  There is no payment for a 
donation, and, obviously, the notion of donation is retained.  These deductions are incentives for 
charitable giving, so the tax deduction is technically a benefit for one’s charitable gift.  Some, 
like Veatch, might argue that this is just semantic manipulation, and tax deductions constitute an 
indirect organ payment.  But analogously this would mean that tax deductions for monetary 
donations would be a payment for the actual cash or check involved in the donation, which 
doesn’t make sense (Veatch, 2003). 
  This system would allow incentivized kidney donations that pass the two conditions of 
avoiding, or minimalizing, commodification of the body.  The deduction amount would have to 
be a large figure, because there’s a rather ungenerous exchange rate between actual tax savings 
and the dollar amount of the deduction.  For example, let’s say this year Shelly decided to sell 
her kidney instead of making monetary donations, and let’s posit that the tax deduction for a 
charitable kidney donation is $50,000. Shelly would then be paying taxes on only $100,000 of 
that income rather than her annual salary of $150,000.  In her tax bracket with the progressive 
income tax of 2011, she would pay roughly $35,600 in income taxes without the deduction.  
When the deduction is added, she saves roughly $14,000 by paying only $21,125 in income taxes 
(Charity Navigator, 2015). Thus, this is an effective way to incentive organ donation and address 
the vast global organ shortage, while not making the body a commodity or subject to the 
commercial market ideology (Wilkinson and Garrard, 1996). 
5.2) Lopsided Compensation Incentives, Stigmatization, Suppression of Altruism 
 There are also fairly obvious solutions for the disadvantages of lopsided compensation 
incentives, stigmatization, and suppression of altruism as well. For example, if there’s an evident 
need to offer more non-financial incentives such as longer periods of free health insurance rather 
than merely one free year, then the obvious answer would be to scale back some of the financial 
incentives for more non-financial incentives of longer periods of free health insurance. In fact, 
this works well with the use of tax deductions rather than direct monetary payments (Pajouhi, 
Zahedi, Pajouhi, and Larijani, 2014). 
As for stigmatization, it seems fairly obvious that once the system would be expanded to 
a global perspective and brought into the open the stigmatization of donors would be 
dramatically decreased.  There are even historical precedents for this in America with the 
legalization of abortion and relegalization of alcohol, because stigmatization of those partaking 
in these two things has dramatically decreased, with the exception of certain religious groups, 
since it was legalized, normalized, and brought into the open. There’s even evidence from two 
recent studies in Iran that this is the case, though prior studies have said differently (Koplin, 
2014). However, it’s been well documented that the studies and literature used to suggest this 
stigmatization in Iran, as well as falsely give evidence for Koplin’s arguments, are outdated and 
were performed before Iran’s “renovation” of their transplant system, which brings their validity 
and accuracy very much into question (Frye-Revere, 2014). 
Addressing the weakness of suppression of altruistic donation is difficult, because it’s 
difficult to know exactly where the problem lies. It’s well-documented that patients’ families 
often times prefer to compensate another donor rather than donate their own kidney (Aramesh, 
2014). However, as long as kidneys are readily available and procured in an ethical manner as 
described above, it’s not obvious why this should necessarily be a problem. Of course, in a 
perfect world altruistic donation is much more preferable than compensated donation, but it’s not 
a perfect world and altruistic and cadaveric donation simply cannot meet the demands of the 
global organ waiting lists. Furthermore, since live kidney donation is a morally supererogatory 
act, there should be no expectance of these types of situations anyways. Instead, we should be 
prioritizing our attention to increasing the number of altruistic cadaveric organ donations, 
because these are types of altruistic acts that are more likely to have widespread effects without 
requiring too much sacrifice from people. 
 5.3) Harming or Helping the Poor? 
 As for addressing the last weakness of the Iranian model, i.e. exploitation or the using of 
poorer populations for kidney donations, it is similar to the problem of commodification in that it 
is a fundamental objection to the practice and will always be present in one way or another. It 
has been suggested that this objection is a particular weakness for the Iranian model specifically, 
because study statistics show that roughly 84 percent of organ donors are poor with the final 16 
percent coming from the middle class of Iran. This suggests that these populations are being 
“exploited” due to their financial status, and their decisions might be unfairly skewed by the 
financial incentives involved (Ghods and Savaj, 2006). 
 It must be noted that this objection is subject to a claim of arbitrariness, though, because 
there are many other instances of “exploiting the poor” that are never mentioned by these 
opponents. Critics say that there’s a necessary connection between discrimination and 
compensated donation due to the greater response shown by vulnerable poor populations to the 
financial incentives of organ sale. The greater effect that the financial incentives put on 
vulnerable populations is discriminatory and unethical. Robert Veatch makes this point, 
recognizing it as a radical idea.  Every financial transaction would be exploiting the poor under 
such broad, wide-ranging criteria.  Things like risky, low-paying, or unpleasant jobs would also 
be exploitation of the poor, because they disproportionately affect and influence poorer 
populations, which is seen by these jobs’ employee demographics.  Thus, analogically speaking, 
these types of jobs should also be prohibited under this objection due to their disproportionate 
influence on poorer, vulnerable individuals. Of course, this is an absurd claim to make, thus 
showing the skeptical and arbitrary nature of this objection when it is only applied to 
compensated donation (Veatch, 2003). Furthermore, the exploitation objection also contains 
notions that systems of compensated donation exploit the vulnerable poor only to help the rich. 
However, as previously mentioned this isn’t true within the Iranian model, because studies 
suggest that over half of kidney recipients are poor, which further weakens the strength of this 
perceived weakness (Ghods and Savaj, 2006). 
 Nevertheless, though informed consent is taken from all kidney donors prior to 
transplantation in Iran’s model, further steps can be taken to ensure that patients are making a 
truly free decision without being unduly pressured by their financial situation (Aramesh, 2014). 
This could be completed by following a set protocol that coincides with the four steps of 
informed consent: disclosure, understanding, voluntariness, and formal consent (ten Have and 
Jean, 2009). Pre-operation counseling sessions would be able to meet the first several steps of the 
process.  During this session, a transplant specialist, and maybe even an ethicist, would disclose 
all of the relevant information about the procedure to the patient, including side effects, risks, 
success rate, etc.  They would also have to check for an adequate amount of understanding of 
that information, and this could be completed via an informative quiz similar to loan counseling.  
After the initial counseling session, there would be a waiting period of one to two months for the 
donor to reflect upon the decision and make sure it is what they really desire.  If it is, the donor 
would come back for a final counseling session where express written consent would be attained.  
A protocol of this nature would ensure informed consent, respect the donor’s autonomy, and 
ensure that finances aren’t an unduly and overly-influential factor in the patient’s decision 
(Hansmann, 1989). 
6) Conclusion 
  To conclude, though the Iranian model of kidney donation compensation isn’t perfect, 
there are some simple, subtle changes that can be made to make it a more practical and ethical 
model for a global system of kidney donation compensation.  It will never be a perfect model, 
and both proponents and opponents of compensated organ donation will raise issues with one 
component or another. However, this revised model provides a nice compromise for both 
proponents and opponents of a system of compensated donation to meet in the middle for a 
global solution to a massive problem.  The model favors proponents’ arguments in that it has the 
potential to reduce global kidney waiting lists and organ trafficking, promote the global ethical 
principles of autonomy, justice, beneficence, and non-maleficence, and provide both financial 
and non-financial assistance to those who need it most.  On the other hand, the model favors 
opponents’ arguments in minimizing commodification, exploitation, and associative harms, all 
while placing a high priority and interest in ensuring informed consent.  As a whole, this revised 
model is a great start towards addressing the global problems of kidney shortages, organ 
trafficking, and transplant tourism, and it sets a great precedent of solidarity and cooperation to 
come together to propose a model that speaks to and addresses the arguments of both sides. 
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